Infrastructure Development Approaches
Introduction:
Since the start of the war in Afghanistan, Afghan infrastructure has been weakened. Currently most of the country’s infrastructure is incapacitated. The destroyed infrastructure has led to instability and poverty. Disarmament is the solution to Afghanistan’s infrastructure deficiency. Our aim is to disarm Taliban insurgents and give them job security in infrastructure development or microfinance. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is currently on the ground in Afghanistan working to “expand and improve access to economic and social infrastructure”[1]. Their focus is on providing energy, roads, water access and buildings. USAID works in partnership with the government; it is an extension of the Afghan government. Through the Afghan Transitional and Rehabilitation Program (ATRP), our goal will be to disarm Taliban insurgents and place them in secure infrastructure projects or provide them with microfinance options. The Afghan government will play a very limited if not inactive role in this project. The government is not responsible; not providing basic resources to the people, its involvement in corruption with officials stealing government funds will be no help our infrastructure goals. It will be extremely difficult to work with the Afghan government, so USAID will work with local leaders and tribal chiefs as authority figures instead of the corrupt national government. Infrastructure projects and microfinance opportunities would be much more effective, as support from local leaders would be more reliable.
Current Conditions:
Electricity, roads, schools, irrigation-water, health care and lack of agricultural infrastructure are the main problems we wish to fix. “85% of Afghans live on agriculture, but the infrastructure is not there to make it profitable which is why they turn to opium. The 25 billion in aid goes mainly to cities and is wasted on corruption and fruitless initiatives”[2]. We need to funnel American aid to rural areas, to help with agriculture, electricity, safe drinking water, and heath care.
“For example almonds from California are subsidized in Afghanistan, this making them less expensive than locally grown almonds. The US needs to change that. By law the U.S. can’t help Afghans grow any crop that will compete with US farmers”[3]. This law is preventing us from helping Afghans sustain themselves. Although the law helps our farmers, it diminishes our goals in Afghanistan. US protectionism must be reduced, we must make certain sacrifices, if we wish to improve Afghanistan’s infrastructure and ultimately win this war.
Step by Step Demilitarization of Afghan troops:
Disarmament will not happen in one swell swoop; disarmament will most likely come incrementally among different components. In order for significant disarmament to take place will require four stages, assembly, discharge, and reinsertion and reintegration. This four stage process is based off of a model by Professor Lloyd J. Dumas from the University of Texas in his article “The Role of Demilitarization in Promoting Democracy and Prosperity in Africa” This method has been implemented in many African countries after a conflict. This method will be the basis of our demilitarization plan and will proceed as follows:
In the assembly stage former combatants have to be retained and reoriented. Former combatants have to be brought together to be counted, disarmed and given ID cards. They are also given temporary food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. When former combatants are ready to be discharged to their homes transportation should be provided. Former combatants should not remain together in the same area, as that can lead to future conflict. In the reinsertion and reintegration stage, future counseling is necessary to help former combatants become familiar with their new surroundings and their responsibilities in their communities. The community at large should help in the counseling. Former combatants should not receive too much assistance as this can lead to dependence. [4]
Technical Occupations:
According to a 2006 survey of the Afghan people, “reconstruction and development is occurring at a slow pace. Electricity and water are major concerns. At the local level, infrastructure is the biggest problem. Services like safe drinking water, health care, and electricity are also major concerns”[5]. We want to get civilians involved and implement a campaign were they are responsible for the development of their own communities. We will instruct and supply resources but much of the coordination will be left up to the community to implement.
Security is the key for infrastructure development, as to safely build and maintain the infrastructure. Under the ATRP program insurgents are given their assignments and will then enter a three month paid training session. After three months, participants are given a full time position in their sector. The sectors that need the most attention are electricity, roads, schools, irrigation-water, health care and agricultural infrastructure. ATRP would create development centers in each region. Disarmed Taliban would be sent to the various regions. They would be trained by contractors of ATRP and put to work on one of the development sectors. It would be important to develop a relationship with local leaders so that they have some semblance of control over these projects.
Microfinance Option:
ATRP will work with BRAC to help community banks issues loans to former combatants. They are given funds for agricultural projects or small business projects. Depending on the trajectory of the project, former combatants are granted micro-loans, small enterprise loans, or seasonal agricultural loans. Loans are required to be paid back but with no interest, as this is in accord with Sharia principles. Microfinance networks will be established to focus on community partnerships that offer assistance to members when repayment issues occur. A sign of success is if the funds coming into the bank and the demand grow quickly.
[1] USAID Afghanistan, Infrastructure. Objective (2010) http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Program.25a.aspx
[2] Christopher Booker, “What Afghanistan Needs is Infrastructure”, The Telegraph. (July 2008). http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/christopherbooker/3560238/What-Afghanistan-needs-is-infrastructure.html
[3] Christopher Booker, “What Afghanistan Needs is Infrastructure”, The Telegraph. (July 2008). http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/christopherbooker/3560238/What-Afghanistan-needs-is-infrastructure.html
[4] Lloyd J. Dumas “The Role of Demilitarization in Promoting Democracy and Prosperity in Africa” GRIP. (1998).
[5] The Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2006: A survey of the Afghan people”. (2006).
